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A recent study questioned the adherence of children with Autism Spectrum Disorders
(ASD) to a linguistic constraint on the use of reflexive pronouns (Principle A) in sentences
like Bart’s dad is touching himself. This led researchers to question whether children
with ASD are able to compute the hierarchical structural relationship of c-command, and
raised the possibility that the children rely on a linear strategy for reference assignment.
The current study investigates the status of c-command in children with ASD by testing
their interpretation of sentences like (1) and (2) that tease apart use of c-command and
a linear strategy for reference assignment.
(1) The girl who stayed up late will not get a dime or a jewel (C-command)
(2) The girl who didn’t go to sleep will get a dime or a jewel (Non C-command)
These examples both contain negation (not or didn’t) and disjunction (or). In (1), negation
c-commands the disjunction phrase, yielding a conjunctive entailment. This gives rise to
the meaning that the girl who stayed up late won’t get a dime and she won’t get a
jewel. In (2), negation is positioned inside a relative clause and it does not c-command
disjunction. Therefore, no conjunctive entailment follows. Thus, (2) is true if the girl just
gets a dime or just a jewel, or possibly both. If children with ASD lack c-command, then
(1) will not give rise to a conjunctive entailment. In this case, children might rely on a
linear strategy for reference assignment. Since negation precedes disjunction in both
(1) and (2), they might be interpreted in a similar manner. Likewise, children who show
knowledge of c-command should perform well on sentences governed by Principle A.
These hypotheses were tested in experiments with 12 Australian children with HFA, aged
5;4 to 12;7, and 12 typically-developing controls, matched on non-verbal IQ. There was
no significant difference in the pattern of responses by children with HFA and the control
children on either (1) and (2) or the Principle A sentences. The findings provide preliminary
support for the proposal that knowledge of c-command and Principle A is intact in HFA
children.
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INTRODUCTION
Individuals with ASD are known to have difficulties with
language and communication. They present with little functional
communication at one end of the spectrum to relatively well-
developed language skills at the other (American Psychiatric
Association, 2000). Nevertheless, no matter how proficient their
language skills, all individuals diagnosed with autism share
impairments in everyday use of language. Difficulties with
pragmatics and prosody are understood as defining universal
features of the disorder (e.g., Paul et al., 2005) but the status of
grammatical development is less clear1. Some researchers have
argued that grammatical knowledge is simply delayed in nature2
(Tager-Flusberg, 1981; Lord and Paul, 1997) while others argue
that there are aspects of grammatical knowledge that are deficient
(Pierce and Bartolucci, 1977; Bartolucci et al., 1980; Perovic et al.,
2013a,b).
There have been few studies on complex syntactic structure
in children with autism and there is not yet consensus on
whether or not aspects of syntax are impaired. The issue is
complicated by the range of abilities associated with ASD. Those
who are classified as high-functioning (HFA) or score at least
70 on tests of non-verbal IQ3 (e.g., Howlin, 2003) tend to show
sophisticated grammatical knowledge. One area of weakness that
has been noted for children with low non-verbal IQ scores
is morphosyntax. In particular, difficulties were observed for
children’s production of grammatical morphemes that mark
“tense” (Roberts et al., 2004). The finding is that children
with ASD tend to perform worse than children diagnosed with
Specific Language Impairment (SLI). More recently, there have
been investigations into the comprehension of complex syntactic
structures such as wh-questions (Zebib et al., 2013), relative
clauses (Riches et al., 2010; Durrleman and Zufferey, 2013;
Durrleman et al., 2015), raising and passives (Perovic et al.,
2007). Durrleman et al. (2016) assessed the comprehension of
both relative clauses and wh-questions in French and showed
that children with ASD had lower performance even on simple
structures as compared with their typically-developing (TD)
peers who were matched on non-verbal abilities4. Riches et al.
(2010) showed that English-speaking teenagers diagnosed with
1Grammar here refers to the structural aspects of language, or syntax.
2Mixed with this line of argument is the claim that grammar is relatively but
not entirely spared in autism. In other words, the grammatical skills are better
than the pragmatic functioning observed for the disorder. For example, Eigsti
et al. (2007) observed that children with ASD showed grammatical impairments
as compared to groups matched for both non-verbal IQ and receptive vocabulary.
Other researchers have found no impairments in grammar when compared to
control groups matched for cognitive function, including a Down syndrome group
(Tager-Flusberg et al., 1990).
3Bishop et al. (2000) and Norbury et al. (2002) recommend a cut-off score of 80 on
non-verbal reasoning.
4The results from this study indicate that non-verbal abilities cannot
straightforwardly account for grammatical difficulties observed in autism as
the TD group matched on non-verbal abilities was chronologically younger.
However, the findings are consistent with previous studies that matched children
with ASD to TD children based on non-verbal abilities (e.g., Perovic et al.,
2007). The performance of the TD group developed as a function of their age
and non-verbal abilities. On the other hand, the performance of the ASD group
developed as a function of only their non-verbal abilities.
autism and concomitant language deficits made significantly
more errors than their age matched TD counterparts on subject
and object relative clauses when tested on a sentence repetition
task. A similar difficulty was also reported for the comprehension
of relative clauses in French-speaking adults diagnosed with HFA
(Durrleman and Zufferey, 2013; Durrleman et al., 2015). In an
elicitation task for wh-questions, it was reported that French-
speaking children diagnosed with autism avoided fronting in
their wh-questions (Zebib et al., 2013). Importantly, these studies
all involved movement or structures that encompass relations
where the position that a phrase is interpreted differs from the
position that the phrase is pronounced, a claim that parallels
claims made for SLI (e.g., van der Lely and Pinker, 2014). Two
recent studies by Perovic et al. (2013a,b) investigated the syntactic
relation of binding.5 Binding does not involve movement but
involves a dependency between two noun phrases. These studies
are the impetus for our investigation on c-command in children
with autism, so we introduce these in detail. Since the hierarchical
relationship of c-command forms the basis for our experiments,
we begin by introducing this abstract notion.
C-command is a relationship between nodes in the phrase
structure representation of a sentence. A node A is said to c-
command a node B, if and only if the node that immediately
dominates A also dominates B (see Koeneman and Zeijlstra,
2017). This is illustrated in Figure 1A. In this figure, the node that
immediately dominates A is XP, because it is one step above A in
the phrase structure. The node XP dominates B simply because it
is higher than B in the tree, and it is possible to trace a path down
the tree from XP to B. Therefore, A c-commands B. In Figure 1B,
however, A does not c-command B. For A to c-command B, the
node immediately dominating A would also have to dominate B.
But the node immediately dominating A is ZP, and this node does
not dominate B. This is because it is not possible to trace a path
from ZP directly down the tree to reach B.
The Perovic et al. (2013a) study was based on an experiment
conducted by Wexler and Chien (1985) that was designed to test
children aged 2;6 to 6;6 years of age. The task was a two-picture
Truth Value Judgement Task. In the original task, children were
tested on sentences like Cinderella’s sister points to herself/her, in
which the subject noun phrase, Cinderella’s sister, is a possessive
noun phrase. This complex noun phrase provided the potential
antecedents for herself/her. The child’s task was to point to the
picture that matched the sentence spoken by the experimenter.
In one picture, Cinderella’s sister was pointing to herself, and in
the other, Cinderella was pointing to herself. The finding was that
by 5 years of age, children were able to choose the correct referent
for the reflexive 90% of the time.
The experimental stimuli used by Perovic et al. (2013a) used
the same possessive noun phrase subjects but their stimuli
featured the Simpson family. The stimuli included four different
kinds of sentences, shown in (1) to (4) below.
5The interpretation of reflexives (e.g., himself) and pronouns (e.g., him) is
regulated by what is known as Binding Theory (Chomsky, 1981) within the
generative approach. The Binding Theory constrains the interpretation of
reflexives, pronouns and names through three linguistic principles, known as
Principle A, B, and C respectively.
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FIGURE 1 | (A) Hierarchical Structure 1. (B) Hierarchical Structure 2.
(1) Bart’s dad is touching himself. Name Reflexive (NR)
(2) Bart’s dad is touching him. Name Pronoun (NP)
(3) Bart’s dad is licking a lamp post. Control Possessive (CP)
(4) Bart is pointing to Dad. Control Name (CN)
Possessive noun phrases “Bart’s dad” were chosen as the subject
noun phrase because they allow for two potential referents (Bart’s
dad and Bart) for the reflexive or pronoun. This gives the child a
choice between a c-commanding referent (Bart’s dad) and a non
c-commanding referent (Bart).
First let us consider how Principle A is satisfied in the
sentences with a possessive noun phrase subject, like Bart’s dad is
touching himself. Intuitively, we know that Bart’s dad is the only
legitimate antecedent for himself, and that the other potential
antecedent Bart is not, but let us verify this using the notion
of c-command. Consider Figure 2. In Figure 2, Bart’s dad is
the subject of the sentence. This complex possessive phrase is
represented by a Determiner Phrase (DP1). DP1 is broken down
into further components—DP2 (Bart) and D’ containing the
possessive marker and the Noun Phrase, Dad. Applying the
definition of c-command, DP1,Bart’s dad, c-commands himself
as the node immediately dominating DP1,the TP, also dominates
DP3 which is the reflexive, himself. Now let us consider Bart.
We see, the node that immediately dominates DP2 or Bart (that
is DP1) does not dominate himself. Therefore, Bart does not c-
command the reflexive and despite being in the same clause, it is
not a potential antecedent.
A control condition with the same possessive subject noun
phrase and no pronoun or reflexive in the predicate, as in (3),
was included in order to test whether children knew the structure
of possessive noun phrases and could distinguish between the
two potential antecedents Bart’s dad and Bart in sentences that
were not related to knowledge of pronouns or reflexives. This
condition also tested the c-command relation independently of
binding6 in the sense that if children are able to compute the
subject-predicate relations correctly then they should be sensitive
to c-command.
6A binds B, if A c-commands B and A and B are coindexed. Reflexives that
comply with Principle A are bound pronouns as these are c-commanded by their
antecedents and both the reflexive and the antecedent are coindexed and appear in
the same clause (e.g., Sam in “Sami washed himselfi”). Coindexation is shown by
indices below the relevant NP.
FIGURE 2 | The structure for Bart’s dad is touching himself.
The Perovic et al. (2013a) study tested 14 children diagnosed
with autism, ranging in age from 6 to 17 years (M= 11;6). Twenty
seven TD children aged 3–9 years matched on the Kaufman Brief
Intelligence Test (KBIT) (KBIT-TD) and the Test for Reception
of Grammar (TROG) (TROG-TD) formed the control groups.
For the autism group, the mean standard score (SS) for the
matrices subtest of the KBIT, a standardized test assessing non-
verbal IQ, was 65.93. The mean for the TROG, a standardized
test that assesses grammatical comprehension, was 56.5. The task
was the same 2-choice picture selection task. The experimental
findings revealed poor performance on sentences containing a
reflexive as compared with ones containing a pronoun. The
autism group had a mean correct of 67% on the sentences
containing a pronoun (NP), while the two control groups, KBIT-
TD and TROG-TD both scored a mean of 71% correct. On
the sentences containing reflexives, the children with autism
performed below chance, with a mean of 43% correct. This
was significantly different from the control groups; the KBIT-
TD group scored a mean of 92% correct and the TROG-TD
group was 83% correct. There was some individual variation,
however, with 2 of the 14 participants showing the pattern of
better performance on reflexives rather than pronouns. On the
control items containing a name (CN), the children with autism
were significantly worse than the KBIT-TD group but not the
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TROG-TD group. The TD matched children tended to show
better performance on sentences containing reflexives as early
as age 5. Their performance was in accord with the patterns
established in the previous literature (e.g., Wexler and Chien,
1985; Chien and Wexler, 1990)7.
Perovic et al. (2013a) interpreted the experimental findings
to suggest that children with ASD have a syntactic deficit over
and above any well-established pragmatic difficulties that are
part of the disorder. First, because ASD children did not do
well on reflexives, the authors interpreted this to mean that
Principle A was either lacking or deficient in some way, as this
pattern of better performance on pronouns than reflexives is not
seen in TD children. They consider the proposal that children
are assigning reference using a linear strategy to determine
the antecedent for the reflexive, but leave this possibility open.
Reliance on a linear strategy would mean that a child with autism
could assume that an antecedent for reflexive is a preceding
noun phrase that appears in the same clause as the reflexive.
Such an assumption would lead to good performance on simple
sentences like Mary points to herself but is expected to give way
to poor performance on sentences like Bart’s dad is pointing to
himself. In this case, since there are two potential antecedents
in the clause, so a child would end up guessing and choosing
either Bart’s dad or Bart as the antecedent. As c-command is
needed to establish the relationship between the reflexive and its
antecedent, Perovic et al. (2013a) interpreted this to mean that
“children with autism do not show sensitivity to c-command in
establishing the complex syntactic dependency of binding, where
the antecedent of a reflexive must c-command the reflexive”
(Perovic et al., 2013a, p. 25).
Not all studies have shown poor performance on reflexives.
This was not the case for a study by Terzi et al. (2014)
that compared performance of reflexives and pronouns in
Greek-speaking children. Before we report the results, a little
background on Greek is in order. Greek differs from English
in that it has two kinds of object pronouns; strong pronoun
and clitic pronouns. English is considered just to have strong
pronouns. The strong pronouns in Greek differ from clitic
pronouns in several ways. First, strong pronouns carry lexical
stress which is not the case for clitics. Second, clitic pronouns can
attach to the verb. Both kinds of pronouns also share important
features. They both inflect for gender, number and case, and
they are never used to refer to an antecedent that appears within
the same clause. Turning to reflexives, Greek reflexive pronouns
are subject to Principle A just like English reflexives, and the
antecedent for a Greek reflexive must appear in the same clause
as the reflexive. Previous research has shown that Greek-speaking
TD children master use of both strong and clitic pronouns at
an early age (see Varlokosta, 2000). With this background in
7The delay in understanding pronouns as compared to reflexives has been
explained in terms of late developing pragmatic knowledge in children (cf. Chien
and Wexler, 1990). Binding principles regulate syntactic binding only. Reflexives
are always bound by their antecedent. Binding is also relevant for pronouns, but
in addition, the notion of coreference is relevant. One prominent proposal is that
children have innate knowledge of Principle B as it regulates whether a pronoun is
bound or free in its clause but they have difficulty with coreference as this invokes
pragmatic knowledge which is subject to maturation (Chien and Wexler, 1990).
place we can turn to Terzi et al.’s (2014) study. In this study, the
children with autism were classified as high functioning based on
their high non-verbal IQ (>80). The control group consisted of
TD children individually matched to the participants with autism
based on raw scores of a vocabulary test. The experiment showed
that the children with autism performed worse than TD children
only on clitics or clitic pronouns (88.3% correct) in contrast to
reflexive pronouns (97.5% correct) and strong pronouns (94.9%
correct). The Greek children with autism performed better than
the English-speaking children in Perovic et al.’s experiment,
where they were only 43% correct on sentences containing
reflexives. However, it is important to acknowledge that there are
slight differences between Greek reflexive pronouns and English
ones. Greek reflexives are complex forms and are inflected
for case and number. Most importantly, reflexivity is not just
expressed through reflexive pronouns but it is also expressed
through special verbal morphology. The results from the Greek-
speaking children are more in line with recent results obtained
for 26 British HFA children who showed good comprehension
of reflexives (Janke and Perovic, 2015) on a two-choice picture
selection task.
In a later study, Perovic et al. (2013b) re-assessed their
experimental findings, with a larger group of children with
autism, aged 6–18 years, using the same stimuli given in (1)–
(4). In this study, participants were divided into two subgroups
according to the presence or absence of language impairment
as measured by their scores on tests of both receptive language
(TROG-2; PPVT-3) and productive language (a vocabulary
subtest of the KBIT). The group with language impairment,
the ALI group, consisted of participants scoring below the 10th
percentile on at least 2 of the three tests. In this experiment,
only the ALI group performed worse on the sentences containing
reflexives (M = 49% correct) such as (1) as compared to the
sentences containing pronouns (M = 71% correct) like (2). The
ALI group consistently showed chance performance on sentences
containing reflexives. Thus, this group of children did not seem to
distinguish between potential antecedents (Bart’s dad and Bart)
for the reflexive. The performance of the ALI group was not
different between the Name Pronoun (NP) and other control
conditions, the Control Possessive (CP) condition (Bart’s dad is
licking a lamp post; M = 77% correct) and the Control Name
(CN) condition (Bart is pointing to Dad;M = 79% correct). The
performance of the children without language impairment, the
ALN group, showed better performance on sentences containing
reflexives (M = 96% correct). Both the ALI and the ALN
groups (M = 83% correct) showed delayed comprehension of
pronouns consistent with a delay in their “linguistic” pragmatic
knowledge.
The results from the larger group of children with autism
provided support for the proposal that Principle A is either
missing or incorrectly represented in the group of children
designated as ALI. The authors elaborate their proposal as
follows: “It is not necessarily the case that children with ALI
cannot compute c-command; they might be able to use it
to constrain representations in other constructions” (Perovic
et al., 2013b, p. 146). The authors further propose that the
“ALI version of Principle A constrains the ALI child only to
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having a clause-mate antecedent of the reflexive, missing the
c-command part of Principle A” (Perovic et al., 2013b, p. 146).
However, one could ask that why is c-command missing only
in the application of Principle A, given that it is a very general
hierarchical notion. The puzzle is that the ALI group performed
quite well on the Control Possessive condition (CP) that was
hypothesized to test for c-command relations outside the domain
of binding. On these trials, the children were 77% accurate. So,
we might ask why children performed poorly on the sentences
containing reflexives (49%), but well on the controls, given that
c-command is necessary to identify the correct antecedent in
both cases. To explain this puzzle, we could interpret Perovic
et al.’s discussion in the following way. In order to pick out the
correct antecedent for the reflexive, children not only need to
have knowledge of c-command, but they also need to understand
that the relationship between the reflexive and its antecedent is
one of variable binding8. Given the added complexity introduced
by variable binding, children end up guessing, hence their chance
performance. In the control sentences such as Bart’s dad is
licking a lamppost, c-command is still a necessary prerequisite
for identifying the correct referent. In this case, without the
added complexity of variable binding, children are able to use a
linear strategy to identify a clause-mate antecedent. This strategy
means they tend to take the nearest noun as the referent for the
antecedent, so they choose the noun dad from Bart’s dad, and
overall, end up with roughly 77% correct performance on the CP
control items9.
Other issues arise when considering the difference in results
between the ALI and ALN groups of children (Perovic et al.,
2013b). The ALI children examined by Perovic et al. (2013b)
had low non-verbal abilities. This observation suggests that
children on the lower end of the autism spectrum have problems
with advanced syntactic structures and serves as motivation for
matching TD and ASD children in terms of non-verbal abilities.
In our study, we chose to examine children on the higher end of
the spectrum (see Terzi et al., 2016a,b). One question that arises
is why the ALN children performed well in the second study by
Perovic et al. (2013b). Is it the case that this group of children
8Both reflexives and prnouns can serve as bound variables. To take an example,
in the sentence “Every girli thought shei/k could participate in the competition,”
the pronoun “she” is bound by the quantificational expression “every girl.” In
this example, it is easy to see that the pronoun can function as a variable. The
sentence is, in fact, ambiguous. If the pronoun “she” is taken to be a referential
pronoun, then it refers to some unnamed female individual. In this case, the
sentence means that every girl thought that this female individual could participate
in the competition. On the alternative interpretation, the pronoun “she” acts as a
variable. On this interpretation of the sentence, there are multiple girls, each of
whom thinks that she herself could participate in the competition. In a sentence
like “Bart’s dad is touching himself” the reflexive is a bound variable even though
it doesn’t pick out a range of individuals. This is simply because the lexical item
himself is singular. If the sentence was “Bart’s kids are touching themselves” then
it can be seen that there are multiple individuals who could each be touching
themselves.
9Whether or not variable binding is problematic for children with autism is an
issue for future research. Previous research has shown that typically-developing
children as young as 3 and a half years of age can produce bound variable
structures. For example, Thornton (1990) elicited questions such as “Which guys
said they have a blue marble?” in a situation in which each of 3 guys has a marble.
In Thornton’s study, children often opted for the plural form of the pronoun as the
bound pronoun instead of the singular form, he.
has c-command in place, in contrast to the ALI children? Or, is it
the case that due to their high non-verbal abilities and superior
language skills, they were able to adopt a linear strategy for
both the variable-binding sentences containing reflexives and the
control sentences? Or, did children use c-command to identify
the appropriate subject noun phrase for both the Name Reflexive
sentences and the Control Possessive sentences? The sentences
with a possessive NP (e.g., Bart’s dad) used in this study do not
allow us to tease apart the difference between using c-command
and using a linear strategy to correctly identify the antecedent,
so we turn to a different structure to further investigate these
possibilities in children with ASD.
We introduce a novel experiment that differentiates between
interpretations computed based on the basis of knowledge of
c-command and ones based on linear order. The experiment
rests on the interpretation of disjunction (“or”). There has
been some debate in the literature over whether “or” in child
language corresponds to “inclusive-or” as in classical logic, or
“exclusive-or,” so we review this briefly here. Some researchers
have pointed out that the majority of input to children is
consistent with “exclusive-or” because the contexts in which
children hear disjunction are ones in which only one of the
disjuncts is true (Braine and Rumain, 1981, 1983; Morris, 2008).
For example, Morris (2008) examined 240 transcripts of parent-
child interaction in the CHILDES database (MacWhinney, 2000).
There were 465 spontaneous uses of “or” in a corpus of 100,626
conversational turns. In this corpus, “or” was used in situations
where only one of the disjuncts was true between 75 and
95% of the time. As Crain and Khlentzos (2007, 2010) point
out, however, a situation in which one disjunct is true is also
consistent with “inclusive-or.” If “or” is “inclusive-or,” then A or
B is true when A is true; when B is true or when A and B is true.
So, the fact that children hear disjunction in a context in which
one disjunct is true does not favor the proposal that children
understand disjunction as “exclusive-or.”
Consider a statement such as “Every child took a tiger or a
dinosaur.” This is true in circumstances in which there are three
children; one takes a tiger, one takes a dinosaur and the third
child takes both a tiger and a dinosaur. Adults reject such a
statement in this circumstance, however. This is argued to be
due to the implicature of exclusivity. Children, on the other
hand, have been found to be less sensitive to the implicature.
For example, Gualmini (2003) tested children’s interpretation of
sentences like Every child took a tiger or a dinosaur in the story
context just described, in which one child chooses a tiger, another
a dinosaur, and the third child chose both animals. Unlike adults,
the child participants accepted the puppet’s description 71% of
the time. In certain contexts, such as contexts of betting or
uncertainty, however, the implicature of exclusivity is canceled,
and then the finding is that adults, too, accept sentences with
“or” in all three circumstances. In a further experiment using
conditional sentences such as “If a giraffe or a penguin is on
the stage, then I get a coin,” Gualmini et al. (2001) established
a context of uncertainty, and showed that in this case, also,
children assign the range of truth conditions consistent with
“inclusive -or.” In this experiment, certain animals, such as a
giraffe, or a penguin or both, were placed on the stage, and
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then the stage curtains were opened to reveal the animal or
animals. The puppet produced the conditional statement before
the curtains were opened. This way, there was uncertainty about
the outcome. Once the curtains were opened, the puppet asked
if he got a coin. On some trials, disjunction “or” was replaced
with conjunction “and.” Children clearly distinguished the truth
conditions of disjunction vs. conjunction.When conjunction was
used, as in “If a giraffe and a penguin are on the stage, then I get
a coin” children rejected the sentence when only one animal was
on the stage, unlike when disjunction was used in the sentence.
These experimental findings suggest that “or” is interpreted as
“inclusive-or” in child grammar.
Crain (2008) points out that the “exclusive-or” interpretation
of disjunction yields different properties in negative sentences.
Recall that “A or B” is true only if exactly one of the disjuncts, A
or B, is true. It follows that sentences of the form “Not A or B” are
false only if exactly one of the disjuncts, A or B, is true. Sentences
of the form “Not A or B” are true, therefore, if both disjuncts are
true, and they are also true if both are false. The fact that sentences
of the form “Not A or B” are true if both disjuncts are true is
a consequence of interpreting “or” as “exclusive-or,” (see Crain
et al., 2000). Suppose that John says the following “Mary did not
bring ice cream or cake to the party.” If John’s use of disjunction
is interpreted as “exclusive-or,” then his assertion would be true
if Mary brought both ice cream and cake to the party, which
is clearly not how native speakers of English interpret this
sentence.
On the other hand, if disjunction is “inclusive-or,” then John’s
statement “Mary did not bring ice cream or cake to the party” is
only true in circumstances in whichMary brought neither dessert
to the party. Intuitively, this is the right result for English. The
meaning of such sentences containing negation and disjunction
corresponds to one of the laws of propositional logic, according
to which a negated disjunction “Not (A or B)” logically entails the
negation of both disjuncts. It entails “Not A” and it entails “Not
B.” In classical logic, this law is stated in one of DeMorgan’s laws:
¬ (A ∨ B) => (¬A ∧ ¬B). The interpretation that is captured
by De Morgan’s law depends on the interpretation of disjunction
as being within the scope of negation, where scope assignment
corresponds to the structural notion of c-command in linguistic
theory (see Crain, 2012). This can be seen in Figure 3, where
not c-commands disjunction, or, which is contained in the object
noun phrase. In other words, a “conjunctive” entailment is
licensed by disjunction in the scope of negation, just as long
as disjunction is analyzed as “inclusive-or” (Crain, 2008). From
this point, we will simply assume that “or” is interpreted as
“inclusive-or” in child grammars.
Children’s interpretations of sentences containing negation
and disjunction were tested in a study by Crain et al. (2002)
in typically-developing children aged 3;11- to 5;9 years. This
study is the basis for our study with a group of children
with ASD, so we review it in some detail. The relevant
sentences from the Crain et al. (2002) study are given in (5)
and (6).
(5) The girl who stayed up late will not get a dime or a jewel
(6) The girl who didn’t go to sleep will get a dime or a jewel
Notice that both of these sentences contain negation (either not
or n’t) as well as the disjunction word or. However, they yield
different interpretations. In (5), negation is in themain clause and
c-commands disjunction. See Figure 4. As noted above, when
disjunction is in the scope of negation, this gives rise to the
conjunctive entailment. That is, (5) means that the girl who
stayed up late will not get a dime AND the girl who stayed up
late will not get a jewel. This is the only available interpretation
for this sentence. In the sentence in (6), as in (Figure 5), negation
precedes disjunction. In this case, however, negation, which is
part of the negative auxiliary verb didn’t, does not c-command
disjunction. This is because didn’t is embedded inside the relative
clause who didn’t go to sleep, that modifies the subject noun
FIGURE 3 | Representation for Mary did not bring ice cream or cake to
the party.
FIGURE 4 | Negation c-commands Disjunction.
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FIGURE 5 | Negation does not c-command Disjunction.
phrase. Therefore negation does not c-command disjunction in
Figure 5. Because negation does not c-command disjunction,
the sentence does not give rise to a conjunctive entailment.
Rather, it gives rise to disjunctive truth conditions. This means
that the sentence means the girl who didn’t go to sleep will
get a dime, or the girl who didn’t go to sleep will get a jewel
(or possibly both). Therefore, Crain et al.’s (2002) predictions
were as follows. If children have knowledge of c-command, they
will generate the conjunctive entailment for (5) and reject the
sentence. On the other hand, they should accept (6), since there is
no c-command relation between negation and disjunction in this
sentence. If children do not have c-command, however, and rely
on a linear strategy to interpret sentences containing negation
and disjunction, they should treat the two sentences in the same
way. In this case, it is likely that children will not enforce the
conjunctive entailment but attribute disjunctive truth conditions
to both sentences.
The experiment conducted by Crain et al. (2002) used the
Truth Value Judgement Task (TVJT) to test sentences like (5)
and (6) (Crain and Thornton, 1998). Thirty children, ranging in
age between 3;11 and 5;9 (mean age of 5;0), participated in the
experiment. The experiment was conducted over two sessions.
The participants were also divided in two groups. One group was
presented with two trials of sentences like (5) in session 1 and
two trials of sentences like (6) in session 2. The other group heard
the target sentences in the opposite order. The child participants
watched a story acted-out by one experimenter along with a
puppet, played by a second experimenter. At the end of the story,
the puppet described what he thought happened in the story. The
child’s task was to judge whether or not the puppet said “the right
thing.” That is, children judged the truth or falsity of the puppet’s
description of the story. To ensure that use of disjunction was
felicitous in the experimental context, the stories were presented
in “Prediction Mode.” Instead of having children judge the truth
of the puppet’s statement at the end of the story, the puppet
made a prediction about forthcoming events at some point in the
middle of a story (and it was repeated again at the end). Thus for
(6), for example, half-way through the story, the puppet predicted
how the events might unfold by uttering the target sentence,
The girl who doesn’t go to sleep will get a dime or a jewel. In
such contexts of uncertainty, it is felicitous to use disjunction.
If the child judged the puppet’s statement to be true, then it
was assumed that the child’s grammar generated a structure and
a meaning for the sentence that matched the events that took
place in the story. If the child judged the puppet’s statement to
be false, then it was assumed that the child’s grammar generates
only structures andmeanings that did not match the events in the
story. This inference is based on the assumption that, whenever
possible, children (and adults) will access a meaning that makes
the puppet’s sentence true. This is called the Principle of Charity
(Davidson, 2001). If children and adults adhere to the Principle
of Charity, then we are invited to make the following inference:
When children and/or adults consistently judge a sentence to be
false, this indicates that they were unable to mentally compute a
meaning representation that makes the sentence true.
The story that was used to test the sentences in (5) and (6)
acted-out a tale of two girls who were waiting for the tooth fairy
to arrive, as they had both lost a tooth. The girls knew that
the tooth fairy would come during the course of the night and
give them a reward in exchange for their lost tooth. One of the
girls decided to go to sleep, as all good girls should do, but the
other girl decided to stay awake. The tooth fairy duly arrived,
bringing along two dimes and two jewels. At this juncture, the
puppet made his prediction about what would happen next. This
was the puppet’s delivery of the test sentence. The story then
resumed. The fairy gave both a jewel and a dime to the girl
who was sleeping. The girl who was awake explained that she
knew she should be asleep but had stayed up because she really
wanted to meet the tooth fairy. The tooth fairy said that she was
disappointed that the girl had not gone to sleep, but still decided
to give her one reward. She gave the girl just a jewel. At the end of
the story, the puppet repeated the prediction made in the middle
of the story, delivering the test sentence for the children to judge.
The main finding from the experiment was that children
rejected sentences like (5), in which negation c-commanded
disjunction 92% of the time. That is, children rejected the
sentences because they generated the conjunctive entailment.
They took (5) to mean that the girl who stayed up late didn’t
get a dime and she didn’t get a jewel. This is false, because
in the story the tooth fairy gave her a jewel. Sentences like
(6) were accepted 87% of the time. There was no c-command
relation between negation and disjunction in (6). The children
generated disjunctive truth conditions; they accepted a sentence
like (6) because it was true that the girl who didn’t go to sleep
got a dime or she got a jewel. The Crain et al. experiment
showed that typically-developing children treat the two sentence
types very differently, rejecting one, and accepting the other.
This suggests that children are generating hierarchical sentence
representations, and that the notion of c-command guides their
interpretation of these sentences. As noted, if children had been
relying on linear precedence or a linear strategy, then there would
be no reason to generate a conjunctive entailment for sentences
like (5). Thus, it is likely that both sentences would have been
interpreted in a similar manner with disjunctive truth conditions.
Returning to children with autism, recall that the Perovic
et al. (2013b) experimental findings showed that the ALN group
of children did well on Principle A, correctly identifying the
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appropriate referent 96% of the time. However, given that the
correct referent (Bart’s dad not Bart) both c-commands the
reflexive, and is, from a linear perspective, the closest and perhaps
most salient potential antecedent, it was difficult to knowwhether
the children were drawing on grammatical knowledge or a linear
strategy. For this reason, we replicate the Crain et al. (2002) study
which distinguishes an interpretation based on c-command from
one based on a linear strategy.
EXPERIMENT 1: DISJUNCTION AND
NEGATION
The goal of the experiment is to determine how children with
ASD interpret sentences containing negation and disjunction.
Crucially, this structure disentangles the confound present in
the Principle A structure used in Perovic et al. (2013a,b). In
sentences with reflexives containing possessive noun phrase
subjects like Bart’s dad, it was not possible to tell whether
correct identification of the antecedent for the reflexive could
be attributed to knowledge of c-command or a linear strategy.
The comparison structure with negation and disjunction tested in
the present study dispenses with this confound. In addition, our
second experiment also incorporates the sentences containing
reflexives as used by Perovic et al. for comparison.
The first experiment used sentences with the same structure
as the study by Crain et al. (2002), ones like (7) and (8).
In (7) negation c-commands disjunction, while in (8), it does
not because the negative auxiliary verb is embedded inside the
relative clause.
(7) The boy who is on the bridge will not get a ball or a car
(8) The boy who isn’t on the bridge will get a ball or a car
The experimental hypothesis was as follows: If children with ASD
can access c-command, they should respond to such sentences in
the same way as typically-developing children. That is, children
should interpret (7) as the boy who is on the bridge will not
get a car and the boy who is on the bridge will not get a ball.
In other words, they should generate a conjunctive entailment
when disjunction appears in the scope of negation. However,
if children with ASD cannot access the requisite notion of c-
command, they should draw no distinction in the interpretations
assigned to sentences (7) and (8). In this case, they would be
unlikely to enforce a conjunctive entailment for (7). Furthermore,
if c-command is not guiding children’s interpretations, they may
adopt a linear strategy. Since negation precedes disjunction in
both (7) and (8), the expectation is that children would interpret
both sentences in the sameway, with disjunctive truth conditions.
Methods
Participants
Twelve children on the autism spectrum participated in the study.
Their age ranged from 5;4 to 12;7, with a mean of 9;11 years.
Children with autism were recruited from a special school for
children with ASD, located in Melbourne. Children in Sydney
were recruited from a Special Education Centre. In addition
to these schools, children diagnosed with autism were also
recruited from advertisements placed on the Autism Spectrum
Australia (ASPECT) website. A formal diagnosis of autism was
established based on previous assessment reports as provided
by the parents or children and as identified by the specialist
school. The children who made up the control group (typically-
developing children) were recruited from general advertisements
placed on Macquarie University campus. Only children whose
first language was English were recruited for both the groups. Ten
adults were also recruited in the pilot phase for the experiment.
They were students recruited from general advertisements across
the campus. This study was carried out with the approval of
Human Research Ethics Committee at Macquarie University
(Ref: 5201200880).
The children with autism all had verbal communication skills.
This group of children was tested on standardized tests of
language and cognition. These tests included the matrices subtest
of KBIT (Kaufman and Kaufman, 2004) measuring non-verbal
IQ and the Test for Reception of Grammar Second Edition
(TROG-2; Bishop, 2003). Based on the scores of the KBIT, the
children who formed the group with ASD can be described
as high-functioning (HFA), as the majority of children had a
standard score of more than 80 (Howlin, 2003; Norbury, 2005).
The TD children (n = 12) were matched to the children with
autism within 2 points of the KBIT raw scores. The age of the
children in the matched comparison group ranged from 5;10 to
8;10,M = 7;1. Table 1 summarizes the descriptive data.
Procedure
Before testing, all caregivers provided informed consent for their
child’s participation, in accordance with ethical guidelines set
out by the Human Research Ethics Committee at Macquarie
University. The present experiment used the dynamic TVJT
(Crain and Thornton, 1998) as in the study by Crain et al. (2002).
The task of the child was to judge the truth or the falsity of
the given sentence spoken by the puppet. In order to make
disjunction felicitous in the context, the TVJT was adapted to use
in the prediction mode (see Chierchia et al., 1998), again, as in
Crain et al. (2002). Accordingly, our story was interrupted half
way through and the first experimenter who acted as a dog while
manipulating toys asked Kermit, the second experimenter, what
he thought would happen next. Kermit replied by uttering the
target sentence and the story resumed. At the end of the story,
Kermit repeated his prediction to remind the children about the
events that occurred in the story. In the present experiment,
the stories were videotaped, and the videotaped scenarios were
presented to the children on an iPad. This step ensured consistent
presentation, and allowed a single experimenter to present the
stimuli. The experimenter who demonstrated the iPad videos to
children instructed them to judge Kermit’s sentences at the end of
each story. The trials in our study were not split up into different
sessions as was done by Crain and colleagues. All the participants
in our study heard all the test trials in the same session. See
Figure 6 for a snapshot of the experimental trial.
Each child was tested individually either in a quiet corner
of a room at the school or in the Language Acquisition Lab
at the University. The testing for each child, including the
standardized tests lasted for approximately 1.5 hours. If the child
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TABLE 1 | Participants’ ages and mean scores (standard deviations) on
standardized tests of language and cognition.
Autism (n = 12) TD (n = 12)
Mean chronological age in years (SD) 9;11 (2;4) 7;1 (0;9)
Range 5;4 – 12;7 5;10–8;10
KBIT matrices standard scores (SD) 94.41 (12.19) 114.8 (11.10)
Range 74-121 91–127
KBIT matrices raw scores (SD) 25.75 (6.19) 25.25 (6.07)
Range 15–34 16–34
TROG 2 Raw scores (SD) 9.67 (5.06) –
Range 3–16 –
TROG 2 Standard scores (SD) 76.58 (17.05) –
Range 55–104 –
FIGURE 6 | A trial from Experiment 1.
had difficulty paying attention, the session was split into two
parts. All participants were told that they would watch short
stories and hear a puppet who tries to say what would happen
next. Their task would be to evaluate whether the puppet in
the iPad presentation was right or wrong. If the puppet was
wrong, children were asked why they thought that the puppet
was wrong. All the verbal responses of children were digitally
recorded. Children’s judgments of the test sentences were scored
as “Yes” or “No.” Percentages of correct rejections or acceptance
for particular items were calculated for each child.
Stimuli
The experiment included 4 stories to test the structure in (7)
in which there is a c-command relation between negation and
disjunction. The c-command sentences like (7) were associated
with rejections of the test sentence, in keeping with the
TVJT methodology. In order to demonstrate their knowledge
of c-command and the resulting constraint on interpretation,
children had to overcome the Principle of Charity and reject the
sentences. There were also 4 stories for the kind of structure
as exemplified in (8), in which there is no c-command relation
between negation and disjunction. One of the four stories was
associated with rejection in order to catch a biased style of
responding where children might implicitly pair c-command
stories with a “no” response and non c-command stories with a
“yes” response. The stories were presented/played to each child
in random order. The experimenter chose the video clip of any
story at random for presentation. The testing session started with
two practice trials. Both the practice trials were paired with a “no”
response. These practice trials both contained negation (e.g., “The
cook will not let Elmo eat the cake”). SeeTable 2 for a complete list
of all test sentences.
Results
The main finding was that the group of children with ASD
performed in a similar manner to the typically-developing group
of children, rejecting sentences like (7) and accepting ones like
(8)10. The group results are summarized in Table 3.
When children were asked why they rejected the c-command
sentences like (7), the children from both groups gave similar
justifications. For example for the test sentence, The boy who
is on the bridge will not get a ball or a car, the children would
say that the puppet is wrong as the boy on the bridge got a car
whereas he was not supposed to get anything. For another test
sentence, The cat who is on foot will not get a fish or milk, the
children would say that the puppet is wrong as the cat on foot
got a fish. AMann-Whitney Test showed there was no significant
difference in the responses of the HFA group and the TD children
for the c-command sentences (Z= 1.3568, p= 0.17384) or for the
non c-command sentences (Z = 0.4907, p = 0.62414). A Mann-
Whitney Test was also conducted to compare performance on
the c-command and non c-command sentences within both the
groups. The difference was significant for both the HFA (Z =
2.4537, p = 0.01428) and the TD groups (Z = 3.7816, p =
0.00016).
There was a significant difference in performance between
the two types of sentences for both the groups. This finding
is comparable to that obtained by Crain et al. (2002). In their
experiment, children rejected the c-command sentences like (7)
92% of the time, and accepted the non c-command trials 87% of
the time. The similar pattern suggests that children with HFA are
able to use the hierarchical structure of c-command to distinguish
between the c-command and the non c-command sentences just
like their TD peers.We return to possible reasons for the fact, that
children were not as accurate on the non c-command sentences
as the c-command trials, in the Discussion section.
In the next experiment, we explore whether these same
children are able to implement c-command to assign the correct
referent for reflexives on sentences governed by Principle A.
If children are able to use c-command to constrain relations
between negation and disjunction, then it is conceivable that
they may still show sensitivity to c-command in establishing
the complex syntactic dependency of binding, unless variable
binding is an issue. If children adopt a linear strategy in
conditions where they face the added complexity of variable
binding then their performance on the control sentences would
be better than their performance on Principle A sentences.
10Recall 3 of the 4 sentences were acceptances, while one was designed to be false
and a rejection.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 9 March 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 402
Khetrapal and Thornton Grammar in Autism
TABLE 2 | List of sentences for C-command and Non C-command trials.
No. C-command sentences Correct response (character gets
one of the objects mentioned)
1 The boy who is on the bridge will not
get a ball or a car
Reject
2 The cat who is on foot will not get a
fish or milk
Reject
3 The Dino who is on the building will
not get a potato chip or peanut
Reject
4 The Penguin who is on the barrel will
not get a coin or a jewel
Reject
No. Non C-command sentences Correct response
1 The girl who is not on her bed will get
cheese or salad
Reject
2 The mermaid who is not on the
plant-island will get a crown or a
seahorse
Accept
3 The thief who is not on the speed
boat will get a blanket or tea
Accept
4 The gardener who is not on the barrel
will get a hat or a seed-bottle
Accept
TABLE 3 | Percentage of correct interpretations (Group Mean) for
C-command and Non C-command sentences.
Sentence types ASD(%) TD(%) Group difference
C-command 89.6 100 Not significant
Non C-command 66.7 68.7 Not significant
Group difference Significant Significant
EXPERIMENT 2: PRINCIPLE A
The present study is concerned with Principle A and reflexives.
Previous studies conducted by Perovic and colleagues make
it difficult to conclude whether the ALN children did well in
identifying the correct referent for the reflexive in sentences
like Bart’s dad is touching himself because their grammatical
knowledge incorporates the notion of c-command or whether
they were simply adopting a linear strategy. As we saw, Bart’s
dad is the only legitimate antecedent for himself, and the other
potential antecedent Bart is not a potential antecedent because it
does not c-command himself.
Methods
Participants
The same child participants (n = 12) who participated in
Experiment 1 also participated in Experiment 2. Their age ranged
from 5;4 to 12;7, with a mean of 9;11 years. Eight adults who did
not participate in Experiment 1 participated in a pilot study to
ensure the viability of the tasks. They were recruited from general
advertisements across Macquarie University.
Procedure
The children were tested on sentences containing reflexives that
are governed by Principle A using the dynamic version of the
Truth Value Judgment Task (TVJT) (Crain and Thornton, 1998).
Our methodology contrasts with that of Perovic and colleagues
who used a 2-choice picture selection task. In our experiment,
as in Experiment 1, the stories were pre-recorded and presented
to the children on an iPad. See Figure 7 for a snapshot of
the experimental trial. The testing procedure was similar to
Experiment 1 except that this experiment did not adopt the
prediction mode. This experiment used the “description mode”
in which the puppet simply tried to say what happened in the
story on its completion. The experimental items were preceded
by two practice items, one designed to be a “Yes” answer, and
the other a “No” answer. The experimenter then proceeded to
the main task. The first story presented to children was always a
Name Reflexive (NR) story containing a reflexive like (1) followed
by a Control Possessive structure story (CP) like (3). Children
were presented with four stories under each category. At the
completion of each story, children judged two sentence types;
first they judged a Name Reflexive story, and then a Control
Possessive story. Children’s judgments of the test sentence were
scored as “Yes” (true) or “No” (false).
Stimuli
The target sentences for the second experiment were sentences
containing reflexives like Bart’s dad washed himself with soap.
This was the same structure as used in the Perovic et al.
experiment, with the addition of a Prepositional Phrase (PP) such
as with soap sentence-finally, to make the sentence seem more
natural. The correct response associated with the Name Reflexive
sentences was always a rejection of the test sentence. The target
sentences were designed to be false to ensure that children have
to override the Principle of Charity. In order to show their
knowledge of the Principle A constraint, children have to go out
of their way to reject the sentence in context, and to explain why
it is false. In addition to the four Name Reflexive target sentences,
there were four Control Possessive (CP) sentences; 2 of these
were designed to be true and 2 were false. This was done in
order to balance the “yes” and “no” responses. These also had the
additional PP sentence finally (e.g., Bart’s dad washed the dog with
shampoo). See Table 4 for a complete list of test sentences.
Results
The main finding was that both the children with ASD and the
TD control group all performed extremely well on the task. See
Table 5 for group mean results of the children.
Each “No” response for the Name Reflexive test sentences
was scored as correct rejection. Responses under the control
possessive or CP condition were scored depending upon whether
children correctly accepted or rejected the test sentences. A
Mann-Whitney Test was used to compare the patterns of
responses by children with autism and the TD children. The
group difference (ASD vs. TD children) was not significant for
the Name Reflexive sentences (Z= 1.0681, p= 0.28462) or for the
Control Possessive sentences. (Z= 0.2887, p= 0.77182). Within-
group analyses were also conducted across the two sentence
types. The difference between NR and CP phrases were not
significant for either the ASD (Z = 0.0289. p = 0.97606) or the
TD control group (Z = 1.5588. p = 0.11876). When children
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FIGURE 7 | A trial from Experiment 2.
TABLE 4 | List of sentences for Principle A.
Name reflexive (NR) Control possessive (CP)
Bart’s dad washed himself with soap Bart’s dad washed the dog with
shampoo.
Robot’s master covered himself with a
blanket
Robot’s master poked the creature with
a stick
Donald Duck’s friend dressed himself in
the costume.
Donald Duck’s friend decorated the bird
with the feather.
Spiderman’s Brother dusted himself
with the hairbrush
Spiderman’s Brother cleaned the rock
with the circus hat
TABLE 5 | Percentage of correct interpretations (Group Mean) for NR and
CP.
Sentence types ASD(%) TD(%) Group difference
Name Reflexive (NR) 79 94 Not significant
Control Possessive (CP) 85 83 Not significant
Group difference Not significant Not significant
were asked why they rejected the test items, children from both
groups gave similar justifying responses. For example for the test
sentence Bart’s dad washed himself with soap. Children’s stated
reason for rejecting it was that Bart’s dad washed Bart with soap.
In a nutshell, the performance of the HFA group does not
differ across the Name Reflexive sentences and the Control
Possessive structures. Children with HFA assigned the correct
referent for reflexives on sentences governed by Principle A, just
like their TD peer group.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Previous studies have shown that in contrast to high-functioning
children with autism (HFA), children on the lower end of
the autism spectrum and those with concomitant language
impairments have difficulty in correctly interpreting sentences
containing reflexives (Perovic et al., 2013a,b). Perovic et al.
argued that the difficulty in interpreting reflexives when they
appear in possessive structures like Bart’s dad is touching himself
arises because children may adopt a linear strategy, permitting
both Bart’s dad and Bart as potential clause-mate antecedents
for the reflexive. As a result, children show chance performance.
Thus, the authors argued that at least the “ALI version of
Principle A constrains the ALI child only to having a clause-
mate antecedent of the reflexive, missing the c-command part
of Principle A” (Perovic et al., 2013b, p. 146). However, this
hypothesis did not make it clear as to why the ALN children
perform better on the Name Reflexive sentences and the Control
Possessive sentences. Using the Principle A sentences with
a possessive noun phrase antecedent like Bart’s dad, it was
not possible to tell whether these children were using their
grammatical knowledge of c-command or a linear strategy to
identify the correct antecedent. For this reason, we tested a new
structure in which these two possibilities are differentiated, the
sentences containing negation and disjunction, which we termed
the c-command and non c-command sentences as illustrated in
(7) and (8) respectively.
We hypothesized that if children with HFA have knowledge of
the hierarchical relationship of c-command, they would generate
a conjunctive entailment for the c-command sentences like The
boy who is on the bridge will not get a ball or a car as disjunction
appears within the scope of negation. That is, they would (only)
get the interpretation on which the boy who is on the bridge
will not get a ball and he will not get a car. However, if the
grammatical knowledge of this HFA group of children was
compromised, we predicted that the children would interpret the
c-command and non c-command sentences in a similar manner.
In this case, they would not be expected to impose a conjunctive
entailment on sentences like (7). Presumably, in this case they
would give the sentence the range of disjunctive truth conditions
that arise for (8). That is, they would allow it to mean that the
boy who is on the bridge will not get a ball, or, alternatively, he
will not get a car, or, possibly he won’t get a ball or a car. The
results obtained showed that the children with HFA tested in
this study were able to use c-command in order to distinguish
between sentences where negation only preceded but did not c-
command disjunction vs. those where negation both preceded
and c-commanded disjunction. In the latter case, the children
were able to generate conjunctive entailment consistent with De
Morgan’s law of propositional logic. If the children with ASD
were adopting a linear strategy then they would have attributed
disjunctive truth conditions to both sentences.
Notice that the pattern of performance for TD children was
more accurate performance on the c-command sentences like
(7) than the non c-command ones like (8). This pattern has
been observed in other studies too. In Crain et al.’s (2002) study
conducted with 4 and 5 year old TD children, the pattern was
similar. Children rejected the c-command sentences like (7)
92% of the time while accepted the non c-command sentences
less, 87% of the time although there was less difference in
the two conditions than in the present experiment. So, why
is it that the children are more accurate on the c-command
sentences? One possibility that was explored by Gualmini and
Crain (2005) was that there is more length between the negation
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and disjunction operators in the non c-command sentences.
They manipulated the number of words between the operators
putting more length (5 words) between the operators in the c-
command sentences like Winnie the Pooh will not let Eeyore eat
the cookie or the cake (5 words) and less length (3 words) in
the non c-command sentences like The Karate Man will give
the Pooh Bear he cannot lift the honey or the doughnut. The
hypothesis was that if length was the relevant factor, children
should perform more poorly on the c-command sentences than
the non c-command ones. However, this was not the case.
The performance of children was 85% correct on c-command
sentences while their performance was 80% correct on the non c-
command sentences. The results showed that the interpretation
of sentences was not determined by the number of intervening
words between negation and disjunction. Consequently, children
assigned a conjunctive interpretation only to sentences where
negation c-commanded the disjunction.
There is another possible account of the lower accuracy on the
non c-command sentences in our experiment with HFA children.
This possibility hinges upon differences in the execution of the
present study and the studies conducted by Crain et al. (2002)
and Gualmini and Crain (2005). Crain et al. (2002) presented
the c-command and non c-command sentences in two different
sessions, to avoid any carryover effects, and Gualmini and
Crain (2005) used a between subjects design. Our experimental
design, on the other hand, was a within subjects design, so
the participants heard both conditions within the same session.
This may have caused some confusion. In addition, some of
the non c-command sentences were true and one false, which
again, may have meant the responses were less accurate for
the non c-command sentences. Nevertheless, the pattern is the
same as Crain et al. (2002) experiment, which leads us to infer
that children’s interpretations are based on computations of
hierarchical sentence representations.
Another noteworthy finding from the present investigation
is that the children with autism did not appear to have any
difficulty processing relative clauses. This result contrasts with
the findings of Durrleman and Zufferey (2013) who reported
comprehension difficulties for both subject and object relative
clauses in HFA French-speaking adults. The present set of
sentences only contains subject relatives (e.g., the boy who is on
the bridge will not get a ball or a car) and it is well known that
object gap relative clauses are more challenging, but nevertheless,
the children with autism performed well on our task. Our
findings are consistent with those reported by Durrleman et al.
(2015) who showed that French-speaking adults with ASD are
more likely to master subject relative clauses than object relative
clauses. The current results are also consistent with the finding
that English-speaking teenagers diagnosed with autism made
more errors on object relative clauses as opposed to subject
relative clauses in a sentence repetition task (Riches et al., 2010).
If children are able to compute hierarchical relations of c-
command for sentences containing logical operators such as
negation and disjunction, then they should able to use the
same relations for interpreting sentences containing reflexives.
If variable binding is an issue, though, it is possible that
children could perform well on computing c-command with
negation and disjunction, but not for Principle A. However,
this latter prediction was not borne out for the HFA group of
children in our experiment. It could be the case for children
with language impairment, but this is yet to be verified. Our
experiment found good performance on both experimental tasks,
both with negation and disjunction and Principle A. Especially
noteworthy is the fact that our current sample of children was
younger (age 5;4–12;7) than the groups examined by Perovic
et al. (2013a,b) who were between 6 and 18 years of age. Our
results are consistent with the performance of Greek children
on binding (Terzi et al., 2014). These authors showed that
Greek-speaking children diagnosed with autism did not show
deficient performance on reflexive binding. It is also reported
by Geutjes (2014) that Dutch children diagnosed with autism
show performance similar to typically-developing children on
Dutch strong and weak reflexives. Although there are language
specific differences between Greek, Dutch and English, which
may introduce further variables, Principle A is nevertheless a
universal principle, and so in principle, there should be no cross
linguistic differences (see Thomas, 1991). A thorough cross-
linguistic comparison of binding in autism will thus be a fruitful
research direction in this regard.
Performance on Control Possessive (CP) sentences was also
similar for both the groups of children in our study. Further
analysis revealed that the performance on the CP condition was
not significantly different from the performance on the Name
Reflexive condition (NR) for both the groups. Taken together,
our results provide evidence for intact grammar in children on
the higher end of the autism spectrum. However, the HFA group
performed 15% lower than their typically-developing peers only
on the reflexive condition. Thus, we settle for a conservative
hypothesis that children with HFA are sensitive to c-command
for constraining relations between disjunction and negation.
They are also likely to be sensitive to c-command for establishing
the complex syntactic dependency of binding instead of relying
on a linear strategy. However, in order to pick out the correct
antecedent for reflexives, children not only need c-command,
they also need to be able to understand that the relationship
between the antecedent and the referent is one of variable
binding. It may thus be possible that future studies with a larger
sample size could show a deficient performance on sentences
governed by Principle A for children with autism. This appears
to be a plausible interpretation of our results as the performance
of the HFA group (85%) was comparable to the performance
of the comparison group (83%) on the control sentences (CP).
The results hint at the possibility that the complexity of variable
binding could pose a problem for children with autism. However,
good performance on the CP sentences is not likely to be the
result of relying on a linear strategy or choosing the nearest noun
as the referent for the antecedent.
Role Played by Non-verbal Abilities
Our findings are in accord with the latest findings reported
by Janke and Perovic (2015). This recent study showed that
26 British HFA children (non-verbal IQ > 80 as assessed by
the Matrices subtest of the KBIT) had intact comprehension of
reflexives. The authors furthermore classified the children as ALI
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 12 March 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 402
Khetrapal and Thornton Grammar in Autism
based on their performance on standardized language tests (the
TROG and the British Vocabulary Scales). Only three children,
classified as ALI, showed less than perfect performance on
reflexives. In other words, the authors noted individual variation.
We did not divide our children into a language intact or language
impaired category due to the comparatively smaller size of the
sample that was only tested on the TROG, although language
scores for 6 children from our sample could be considered
to be in the impaired range11 as they scored below the 10th
percentile (e.g., Whitehouse et al., 2008). Thus in the interim,
we hypothesize that children with HFA form a distinct linguistic
phenotype with respect to intact grammatical functioning (see
Perovic et al., 2013b; Janke and Perovic, 2015). It remains to
be seen whether children with low-functioning autism (LFA)
or those with ALI show any improvements of performance on
a different task which has not been usually used, i.e., TVJT12.
In the meantime, then the general impression seems to be that
LFA children will show deficits of syntax. This is because higher
non–verbal IQ is an important prognostic variable for clinical
populations in general and for autism in particular (Szatmari
et al., 1989). Comparatively, LFA children are at a higher risk
for language impairment irrespective of the degree of intellectual
impairment (Kjelgaard and Tager-Flusberg, 2001).
CONCLUSIONS
In the two experimental studies that we have reported, HFA
children did not have difficulty computing the hierarchical
relationship of c-command. In sentences containing negation
and disjunction, children distinguish the interpretations they
allow, depending on whether or not negation c-commands
negation. In sentences in which there is a c-command relation
between negation and disjunction, children successfully impose
a conjunctive entailment, while attributing disjunctive truth
conditions to sentences in which c-command does not hold.
Furthermore, children are successful in picking out the correct
antecedent for the reflexive in sentences like Bart’s dad washed
himself with soap, in conformity with Principle A. It will be
instructive to replicate these studies in the future with a larger
11Our sample of HFA children had a low mean SS (76.58) on the TROG while the
HFA children examined by Janke and Perovic (2015) had a mean score of 91.73
and those examined by Perovic et al. (2013b) had a mean score of 94.50 on the
TROG. However, our children were chronologically younger than those examined
by Janke and Perovic (2015) and Perovic et al. (2013b).
12Our choice of methodology (a dynamic version of the TVJT) may also have been
optimal (see Sanoudaki and Varlokosta, 2015, who demonstrated task effects for
the interpretation of Greek strong pronouns).
sample of children, while carefully controlling for HFA children
with and without language impairment. This is because studies
report different results for HFA children and LFA (Boucher,
2009), or for children classified as ALI vs. ALN (Tager-Flusberg,
2006). Nevertheless, the findings from our English-speaking
sample of children concur with the findings of English-speaking
British children for binding (Janke and Perovic, 2015). These
investigations all suggest that children at the high end of the
spectrum may not have any kind of syntactic deficiency (e.g.,
Terzi et al., 2016a,b). Further cross-linguistic investigation with
other complex syntactic structures will be important to shed light
on this issue.
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